The Political Economy of Crude Oil Cartelization in the United States, 1933–1972
研究了1933至1972年间美国政府支持的原油卡特尔如何固定州际市场价格，并分析了政治因素对配额、产量和租金分配的影响。
This article examines a government-sponsored cartel that fixed domestic crude oil prices in interstate markets from 1933 through 1972. Although the cartel raised and stabilized nominal oil prices beyond earlier private efforts, it also resulted in politically driven constraints on price, output levels, and cartel rent distribution. Political factors molded quota assignments, diverted production from low- to high-cost producers, and raised production costs. Political pressures prevented Texas from acting as a residual or swing producer. Instead, the interstate oil cartel members maintained nominal prices and spread the political costs of output adjustments.