Labor Selection, Turnover Costs, and Optimal Monetary Policy
研究包含劳动力筛选和离职成本的DSGE模型中的最优货币政策与福利性质，发现标准工资谈判无法抵消的效率损失随解雇成本增加而上升，最优通胀波动率随解雇成本递增。
We study optimal monetary policy and welfare properties of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with a labor selection process, labor turnover costs, and Nash bargained wages. We show that our model implies inefficiencies that cannot be offset in a standard wage bargaining regime. We also show that the inefficiencies rise with the magnitude of firing costs. As a result, in the optimal Ramsey plan, the optimal inflation volatility deviates from zero and is an increasing function of firing costs.