Voluntary Export Restraints, Anti-Dumping Procedure and Domestic Politics
分析政府为何偏好自愿出口限制而非关税，当产业利润对选举的影响大于消费者损失时；反倾销程序能传递信息，促成自愿出口限制，并影响贸易量。
A voluntary export restraint (VER) is preferred to a tariff by a government concerned about electoral returns when the influence of industry profits is large relative to the losses to consumers from higher prices. If the foreign firm is uncertain of these pressures, the antidumping code facilitates the complete transfer of the relevant information and generates a VER rather than a tariff in equilibrium. The choice across instruments is determined by the political attributes. Domestic and foreign profits rise with the antidumping-generated VER, and the VER lowers the volume of trade by more than the expected duty. Copyright 1996 by American Economic Association.