Information Percolation With Equilibrium Search Dynamics
研究一大群人中信息共享的均衡动态，个体选择搜索努力以获取他人信息，发现均衡中个体在获得足够精度后停止搜索，并探讨税收补贴和公共信号对信息共享和福利的影响。
We solve for the equilibrium dynamics of Information sharing in a large population Each agent is endowed with signals regarding the likely outcome of a random variable of common concern Individuals choose the effort with which they search for others from whom they can gather additional information. When two agents meet, they share their information The Information gathered is further shared at subsequent meetings, and so on. Equilibria exist in which agents search maximally until they acquire sufficient information precision and then search minimally A tax whose proceeds are used to Subsidize the costs of search improves information sharing and can, in some cases, increase welfare on the other hand, endowing agents with public signals reduces Information sharing and can, in some cases, decrease welfare