Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices*
通过扩展标准拍卖模型，引入竞拍者对赢或输的预期情绪，解释了实验中二价拍卖普遍过度出价、一价拍卖大估值过度出价而小估值出价不足的现象，并发现情绪即使很小也会显著改变最优保留价。
Abstract The experimental literature has documented that there is overbidding in second‐price auctions, regardless of the valuations of bidders. In contrast, in first‐price auctions, there tends to be overbidding for large valuations, but underbidding for small valuations. We show that the experimental evidence can be rationalized by a simple extension of the standard auction model, where bidders anticipate (constant) positive or negative emotions caused by the mere fact of winning or losing. Even if the emotional (dis‐)utilities are very small, the revenue‐maximizing reserve price might be significantly different from the standard model. Moreover, decreases with the number of bidders.