Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence
提出理论解释企业为何为员工提供一般培训，因为雇主对员工能力的信息优势造成事后垄断，激励其出资培训。利用德国学徒数据，模型预测得到部分支持。
This paper offers a theory of training whereby workers do not pay for the general training they receive. The superior information of the current employer regarding its employees' abilities relative to other firms creates ex post monopsony power, and encourages this employer to provide and pay for training, even if these skills are general. The model can lead to multiple equlibria. In one equilibrium quits are endogenously high, and as a result employers have limited monopsony power and provide little training, while in another equilibrium quits are low and training is high. Using microdata on German apprentices, we show that the predictions of our model receive some support from the data.