Modest Advertising Signals Strength
重新审视价格和广告支出作为质量信号的作用，发现高品质企业会削减广告至低于低品质企业的完全信息水平，消费者对广告削减反应积极并正确识别质量，因此适度广告可能传递高品质信号。
We reexamine the role of prices and advertising expenditures as signals of quality. Consumers are either “fastidious” or “indifferent.” Fastidious individuals value high quality more and low quality less than do indifferent individuals. Then a sensible and robust separating equilibrium exists in which both types set their full-information prices. However, the high-quality firm cuts advertising below the full-information level of the low-quality firm, even if the full-information advertising expenditures of the high-quality firm are larger than those of the low-quality firm. Consumers respond favorably to advertising cuts and correctly identify quality. Hence, modest advertising may signal high quality.