How Should Food Safety Certification be Financed?
分析消费者对产品安全信息不完全时，公共认证体系的福利效应，探讨不同成本结构下的认证费用，发现自愿认证加按单位收费在竞争市场中有效，而垄断时可能需要强制认证加固定费用。
Abstract An analytical framework where consumers are imperfectly informed about the safety of products is used to investigate the welfare effects of a public certification system. Several certification fees under alternative structures of certification cost are analyzed. By maintaining competition among numerous sellers, voluntary certification financed by a per‐unit fee is efficient (and sufficient) to signal product safety. However, mandatory certification linked with a fixed user fee may be necessary if a seller wields monopoly power. Further, certification by a single, private agency results in a distorted fee.