Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations
通过公共品博弈实验，研究了群体成员能否内生选择是否增加奖励或惩罚机制，发现内生选择显著提升合作水平，且群体更倾向奖励机制，尽管惩罚更有效。
We analyse an experimental public goods game in which group members can <it>endogenously</it> determine whether they want to supplement a standard voluntary contribution mechanism with the possibility of rewarding or punishing other group members. We find a significantly positive effect of endogenous institutional choice on the level of cooperation in comparison to the same exogenously implemented institutions. This suggests that participation rights enhance cooperation in groups. With endogenous choice, groups typically vote for the reward option, although punishment is even more effective in sustaining high levels of cooperation. Our results are evaluated against the predictions of social preference models.