Why Bank Credit Policies Fluctuate: A Theory and Some Evidence
提出一个理论，认为理性但短视的银行经理会制定受其他银行和需求方影响的信贷政策，从而引发低频商业周期，并用1990年代初新英格兰银行危机的证据支持该理论。
In a rational profit-maximizing world, banks should msdntain a credit policy of lending if and only if borrowers have positive net present value projects. Why then are changes in credit policy seemingly correlated with changes in the condition of those demanding credit? This paper argues that rational bank managers with short horizons will set credit policies that influence and are influenced by other banks and demand side conditions. This leads to a theory of low frequency business cycles driven by bank credit policies. Evidence from the banking crisis in New England in the early 1990s is consistent with the assumptions and predictions of the theory.