Complementarity and Substituability in Multiple‐Risk Insurance Markets
研究多风险环境下保险公司之间的不完全竞争，发现无信息不对称时均衡有效，但逆向选择下专业化会阻碍次优效率，并探讨战略互补/替代对效率与公平权衡的影响。
We study imperfect competition between insurers in a multiple‐risk environment. In the absence of asymmetric information, equilibria are efficient, and we determine the degrees of specialization under which the specialized insurers are able or unable to capture the surplus. We show in contrast that under adverse selection, specialization systematically prevents second‐best efficiency. Concluding on the role of our notions of strategic complementarity/substituability on the tradeoff between efficiency and fairness of the allocation, we give indications on the desirable structure of the insurance industry.