Hotelling Games with Three, Four, and More Players*
将二次运输成本的区间霍特林模型扩展到n个企业，发现当n>2时企业既不会最大化也不会最小化差异化，且均衡中价格呈U形结构，内部企业竞争较弱，从社会角度看差异化过多或不足取决于企业数量。
Abstract. This paper extends the interval Hotelling model with quadratic transport costs to the n-player case. For a large set of locations including potential equilibrium configurations, we show for n > 2 that firms neither maximize differentiation—as in the duopoly model—nor minimize differentiation—as in the multi-firm game with linear transport cost. Subgame perfect equilibria for games with up to nine players are characterized by a U-shaped price structure and interior corner firm locations. Results are driven by an asymmetry between firms. Interior firms are weaker competitors than their rivals at the corners. Increasing the number of firms shifts even more power to the corner firms. As a result, there is too much differentiation from the social perspective if n ≤ 3, while adding firms leads to a level of differentiation in equilibrium below the social optimum.