“Protection for Sale” in a Developing Country: Democracy vs. Dictatorship
利用土耳其行业数据，检验了Grossman-Helpman“保护待售”模型在民主与独裁体制下的预测，发现民主政体下政府更重视社会福利而非政治献金。
For a "genuine" small open economy that has experienced both dictatorship and democracy, we find support for the predictions of the Grossman-Helpman (1994) "Protection for Sale" model. In contrast to previous studies, we use various protection measures (including tariffs, the direct measure of the theoretical model) and perform both single-year and panel regressions. Using Turkish industry-level data, the government's weight on welfare is estimated to be much larger than that on contributions. More importantly, we find that this weight is generally higher for the democratic regime than for dictatorship. © 2002 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology