On the Economic Success of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement
利用1973至1998年关贸总协定和世贸组织的贸易争端数据，发现原告的报复威胁等权力因素能帮助被告政府兑现贸易自由化承诺，而基本争端解决机制之外的程序或制度特征作用有限。
What features of the dispute settlement process help governments live up to their trade liberalization commitments? Exploiting data on GATT/WTO trade disputes initiated and completed between 1973 and 1998, this paper identifies economic and institutional determinants that help defendant governments commit to liberalizing trade. We find substantial evidence consistent with the theory that power measures, including threat of retaliation by the plaintiff, yield credibility to allow defendant governments to live up to their commitments. We find only limited evidence, however, that particular procedural or institutional features beyond the basic GATT/WTO dispute settlement forum itself contributed to the successful economic resolution of trade disputes. © 2004 President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.