Behavior in Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Vickrey Auctions
通过实验研究多单位需求拍卖中竞拍者对统一价格拍卖中需求削减激励的敏感性，发现密封投标和升价时钟拍卖均存在显著需求削减，但升价拍卖更接近均衡，并探讨动态维克里拍卖如何消除效率损失。
We experimentally investigate the sensitivity of bidders demanding multiple units of a homogeneous commodity to the demand reduction incentives inherent in uniform price auctions. There is substantial demand reduction in both sealed bid and ascending price clock auctions with feedback regarding rivals' drop-out prices. Although both auctions have the same normal form representation, bidding is much closer to equilibrium in the ascending price auctions. We explore the behavioral process underlying these differences along with dynamic Vickrey auctions designed to eliminate the inefficiencies resulting from demand reduction in the uniform price auctions.