Foreign Equity Investment Restrictions, Capital Flight, and Shareholder Wealth Maximization: Theory and Evidence
构建理论模型，分析国内外投资者因持有证券的沉没成本差异导致需求函数不同，国内企业家通过歧视定价实现企业价值最大化，并用瑞士数据验证了资本外逃国家存在外资持股限制的实证含义。
This article provides a theory of foreign equity investment restrictions. We consider a model where the demand function for domestic shares differs between domestic and foreign investors because of deadweight costs in holding domestic and foreign securities that depend on the country of residence of investors. We show that domestic entrepreneurs maximize firm value by discriminating between domestic and foreign investors. The model implies that countries benefitting from capital flight have binding ownership restrictions such that foreign investors pay a higher price for shares than domestic investors. The empirical implications of this theory are supported by evidence from Switzerland. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.