TIPPING AND RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION: A UNIFIED SCHELLING MODEL*
构建了一个空间博弈形式的谢林型棋盘模型，证明即使每个居民都偏好混合种族社区，完全隔离也几乎总是出现，并严格定义了“小费”概念来解释隔离的动态机制。
ABSTRACT This paper presents a Schelling-type checkerboard model of residential segregation formulated as a spatial game. It shows that although every agent prefers to live in a mixed-race neighborhood, complete segregation is observed almost all of the time. A concept of tipping is rigorously defined, which is crucial for understanding the dynamics of segregation. Complete segregation emerges and persists in the checkerboard model precisely because tipping is less likely to occur to such residential patterns. Agent-based simulations are used to illustrate how an integrated residential area is tipped into complete segregation and why this process is irreversible. This model incorporates insights from Schelling's two classical models of segregation (the checkerboard model and the neighborhood tipping model) and puts them on a rigorous footing. It helps us better understand the persistence of residential segregation in urban America.