Productive and Predatory Public Policies: Research Expenditures and Producer Subsidies in Agriculture
构建模型分析政府如何权衡研究支出（生产性政策）与生产者补贴（掠夺性政策），解释农业研究投入不足的原因，并发现美国农业中两类政策互补，使研究投入不足程度较轻。
Abstract Governments are postulated to maximize a political preference function in choosing two policy instruments: research expenditures (a productive policy) that improve social welfare and production subsidies (a predatory policy) that incur deadweight losses. Each policy affects the distribution of income between producers and consumers. Governments determine the optimal mix of policies, taking into account interaction effects between research and subsidy expenditures. In addition to providing an explanation for underinvestment in research, the paper determines conditions under which research and subsidy policies are complementary. Such conditions are shown to characterize U.S. agriculture. Underinvestment in research is therefore less severe than in some other countries.