A Model of Reputation in Cheap Talk*
研究了发送者偏好未知的动态建议博弈，发现发送者群体中不同偏好的比例越均衡，信息可信度越高，但接收者并未从中获益。在政治游说背景下，提高透明度的制度会降低游说者说真话的激励，但明确提升了政策制定者的福利。
Abstract We study a dynamic game of advice where the sender's preferences are unknown to the receiver. The novel feature of the model is that there is more than one type of biased sender. We show that the more equal the proportions of different biases in the sender population, the greater the credibility of the information transmitted. Somewhat surprisingly, however, we also find that the receiver does not benefit from this equality. We discuss our results in the context of political lobbying and show that institutions that increase transparency lower lobbyists' incentives for truthtelling, but unambiguously promote the policymaker's welfare.