Recent Advances in Lending to the Poor with Asymmetric Information
通过文献综述，梳理了小额信贷合同中联合责任和动态激励的理论进展，指出这些合同理论在解释小额信贷社会使命方面的不足。
Abstract\n Microfinance institutions have successfully extended unsecured small loans to poor and opaque borrowers at the bottom of the economic pyramid. This success is largely due to innovative financial contracts that impose joint liability and create dynamic incentives to mitigate the effects of asymmetric information. Given recent advances in microfinance contracts, there is a need to map the theoretical developments. This paper aims to accomplish that, by performing a critical literature survey of microlending contracts, focusing on joint liability and dynamic incentives, bringing out some of the deficiencies of contract-theoretic propositions that cannot effectively account for the social mission of microfinance.