Minority Shareholder Protections and the Private Benefits of Control for Swedish Mergers
利用瑞典并购数据，研究在所有权与控制权高度分离的背景下，少数股东保护如何影响控制权私人收益，发现瑞典的非正式制度（如税收合规和报纸发行）有效弥补了公司治理的不足，减少了股东侵占。
Abstract Sweden has a high degree of separation of ownership from control through pyramids, dual-class shares, and cross-holdings. This increases the potential for private benefits of control. However, Sweden's extralegal institutions—tax compliance and newspaper circulation—are consistent with greater shareholder protection. Using data on Swedish mergers we find limited evidence of shareholder expropriation. Apparently, Sweden's extralegal institutions offset the drawback of weak corporate governance.