The Economics of Administering Import Quotas with Licenses‐on‐Demand in Agriculture
分析按需发放许可证的进口配额制度，发现许可证按比例分配会导致高成本企业获得配额，造成效率损失，并探讨了超额竞标、配额扩大、新企业进入等因素对效率的影响。
A Nash equilibrium is determined for licenses‐on‐demand import quotas where licenses are allocated on a prorated basis. Inefficiency is incurred because licenses are allocated to high‐cost firms. The ability to overbid exacerbates the inefficiency due to proportionate reductions in licenses. Quota expansion causes high‐cost firms to decrease their bids but reduces inefficiency. The entry of a new firm causes all incumbent firms to increase bids or bid the quota. Not penalizing firms for the non‐use of licenses increases inefficiency. The inefficiency impacts of tariff reductions, license fees, limits per firm, and imperfect information are also addressed.