Managerial Agents Watching other Agents: Multiple Agency Conflicts Regarding Underpricing in IPO Firms
研究了IPO公司中董事会管理代理人与承销商之间的利益冲突，发现内部监督和董事会经验能降低抑价，而风险投资家与承销商的先前关系会加剧抑价。
We contribute to multiple agency theory by examining cases in which ventures making initial public offerings (IPOs) have managerial agents on their boards whose goals conflict with those of the investment bank agents hired to underwrite the stock. Underwriters have an incentive to underprice IPOs to maintain strong ties with institutional investors. We develop theory on agent differences based on time horizons and risk taking by managerial agents as framed through behavioral agency theory. Examining governance mechanisms, we find both monitoring by board insiders and board experience decrease underpricing. Furthermore, underpricing increases when venture capitalists have prior ties with underwriters.