A sequential equilibrium for the army's targeted selective reenlistment bonus program
研究了美国陆军定向选择性再入伍奖金计划的序贯均衡，发现该计划通过奖金机制将低成本士兵分配到不理想地点，同时提高留任率和人岗匹配度，对陆军和士兵均有益。
Abstract Wecompute a sequential equilibrium for the U.S.Army'sTargeted Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program in whichtheArmy offers a bonus, soldiers with a low cost of serving in an undesirable location accept the bonus and are sent to an undesirable location, and soldiers with a high cost of serving in an undesirable location reenlist but decline the bonus.Wefind that this program benefits both theArmy and soldiers, increases retention, increases the number of soldierswho serve in an undesirable location, and better matches soldiers to assignments.We discuss implications of our model on human resource management practices for theArmy in its administration of the bonus program and its application to other large organizations that set wages through a rules‐based mechanism. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.