Anti‐Hoarding Laws: A Stock Condemnation Reconsidered
指出反囤积法并非针对垄断囤粮，而是当价格上限导致市场扭曲时，竞争性囤积可能过度，此时反囤积法可作为次优政策。
Abstract Economists have regarded anti‐hoarding laws as irrational reactions to nonexistent monopoly in the storage of grain. This paper shows that anti‐hoarding laws cannot be rationally directed against a monopolistic storer, for he will always store less, not more, than would be stored under competition. But seemingly perverse competitive storage, in the form of excessive stockholding, can arise when a price ceiling distorts the market. Additional public storage exacerbates this perverse private behavior, and may even induce behavior that appears to be active market manipulation. Under such circumstances, anti‐hoarding laws can be desirable second‐best measures.