An Economic Analysis of "Acting White"
用经济学模型分析少数族裔中“装白人”现象，解释为何高教育信号可能引发同伴排斥，导致中等能力者选择相同教育水平，而低能力者被群体接纳。
This paper formalizes a widely discussed peer effect titled "acting White." "Acting White" is modeled as a two-audience signaling quandary: signals that induce high wages can be signals that induce peer group rejection. Without peer effects, equilibria involve all ability types choosing different levels of education. "Acting White" alters the equilibrium dramatically: the (possibly empty) set of lowest ability individuals and the set of highest ability individuals continue to reveal their type through investments in education; ability types in the middle interval pool on a common education level. Only those in the lower intervals are accepted by the group. The model's predictions fit many stylized facts in the anthropology and sociology literatures regarding social interactions among minority group members.