纳什谈判对横向产业整合的启示

Implications of Nash Bargaining for Horizontal Industry Integration

American Journal of Agricultural Economics · 2005
被引 7
人大 AABS 3

中文导读

说明横向产业整合如何源于技术和禀赋的可转移不对称性,纳什谈判解表明协调方技术多样性越大,横向整合收益越大,该框架适用于技术优势企业通过横向整合进行技术特许,并以生猪和肉鸡生产为例。

Abstract

Abstract This article shows how horizontal industry integration can arise from transferable asymmetry of technologies and endowments. The Nash bargaining solution suggests that greater technological diversity among coordinating parties yields greater gains from horizontal integration. The framework fits the case where a firm with a superior technology franchises the technology by horizontal integration. The results appear to fit hog production where integration has been primarily horizontal and, in part, broiler production where integration has been both vertical and horizontal. Specifically, technology has been shared through uniform genetic traits, fine‐tuned feed rations, and veterinary services specified in grower contracts.

纳什议价解横向产业整合技术异质性特许经营