Institutional Markets, Financial Marketing, and Financial Innovation
从代理理论出发，分析机构在金融市场中的行为如何催生对新型金融工具的需求，即使这些工具的收益已被完全定价，并以剥离证券为例说明其需求、供给与营销。
ABSTRACT Firms and institutions are monitored and controlled through a complex set of implicit and explicit contractual relations. Because of these agency theoretic relations, institutional behavior in financial markets is not a simple reflection of the preference structures of individuals. Institutional preferences give rise to a demand for new financial instruments and innovations, even when the returns on these instruments are “spanned” in the sense of complete pricing. The innovations can be thought of as solving moral hazard problems. An agency theoretic example serves to illustrate the demand, supply, and financial marketing of stripped securities. In short, institutions matter.