Auctions with heterogeneous entry costs
研究了竞拍者进入成本不同且为私人信息时，最优保留价高于卖方价值，入场费能增加收入，且入场费加进入人数上限能进一步提高收入。
If bidders have independent private values and homogeneous entry costs, a first‐ or second‐price auction with a reserve price equal to the seller’s value maximizes social surplus and seller revenue. We show that if entry costs are heterogeneous and private information, then the revenue‐maximizing reserve price is above the seller’s value, a positive admission fee (and a reserve price equal to the seller’s value) generates more revenue, and an entry cap combined with an admission fee generates even more revenue. Social surplus and seller revenue may either increase or decrease in the number of bidders, but they coincide asymptotically.