The Need for Enemies
研究发现，一些政客因在反叛乱任务中具有优势而获得选举利益，这反而激励他们故意表现不佳，以维持政治优势；哥伦比亚数据表明，在重创FARC后，政府反而减少了反叛乱努力，尤其在政治重要地区。
We develop a model where some politicians have an edge in undertaking a task and this gives them electoral advantage, creating an incentive to underperform in the task. We test the empirical implications in the context of fighting against insurgents, using Colombian data. The main prediction is that large defeats for the insurgents reduce the probability that these politicians fight them, especially in electorally salient places. We find that after the largest victories against FARC rebels, the government reduced its counterinsurgency efforts, especially in politically important municipalities. Politicians need to keep enemies alive in order to maintain their political advantage. © 2014 Royal Economic Society