Optimal Institutional Mechanisms for Funding Generic Advertising: An Experimental Analysis
针对农产品通用广告法律地位不确定的问题，通过实验模拟影响生产者自愿捐款的经济和心理因素，发现生产者公投能显著提高捐款，且采用门槛为68%-90%的公投机制能最大化生产者剩余。
Given the uncertain legal status of generic advertising programs for agricultural commodities, alternative voluntary funding institutions are investigated that could provide a high level of benefits to producers. This experimental study simulates key economic and psychological factors that affect voluntary producer contributions to generic advertising. The results suggest that producer referenda play a critical role in increasing contributions and that producer surplus is maximized by a provision point mechanism instituted by producer referendum with thresholds ranging from 68% to 90%, and expected funding from 47% to 77% of the time, depending on the level of advertising effectiveness.