Dynamic Monetary Equilibrium in a Random Matching Economy
研究一个无限期经济，交易通过双向拍卖两两进行，法币解决需求双重巧合缺失问题。刻画了个人和整体货币持有分布的演化，发现存在福利排序的单一价格连续统均衡，反映价格水平而非相对价格的不确定性。
This article concerns an infinite horizon economy where trade must occur pairwise, using a double auction mechanism, and where fiat money overcomes lack of double coincidence of wants. Traders are anonymous and lack market power. Goods are divisible and perishable, and are consumed at every date. Preferences are defined by utility-stream overtaking. Money is divisible and not subject to inventory constraints. The evolution of individual and economywide money holdings distributions is characterized. There is a welfare-ordered continuum of single price equilibria, reflecting indeterminacy of the price level rather than of relative prices.