Costly Self‐Insurance of Rights Offerings
研究了配股发行中承销决策如何受发行失败风险影响，发现自保险（通过折价和预承诺）存在隐性成本，支持成本性自保险解释配股悖论。
Abstract We study how the underwriting decision of an equity rights offering is affected by the risk of offering failure. Firms can reduce failure risk by getting underwriting or by self‐insuring through subscription price discounts and subscription precommitments. Self‐insurance is generally regarded to be relatively costless, but we provide evidence from Singapore that is consistent with the existence of implicit costs. In particular, the existence of self‐insurance costs implies that firms with better projects will have larger discounts and that firms with higher ownership concentration will have more precommitments. Hence, our results support costly self‐insurance against issue failure as a factor in explaining the rights issue paradox.