Mutual Fund Advisory Contracts: An Empirical Investigation
实证研究共同基金顾问合同中的边际报酬率，发现股票和外国基金顾问的报酬更高，而大型基金和大型基金家族的顾问报酬更低，反映了边际产品、监督难度和规模经济等差异。
ABSTRACT We investigate marginal compensation rates in mutual fund advisory contracts and find the following. Equity and foreign fund advisors receive higher marginal compensation than debt and domestic fund advisors. Advisors of funds with greater turnover receive higher marginal compensation. Also, closedend fund advisors receive higher marginal compensation than open‐end fund advisors. Finally, we find that marginal compensation is lower for advisors of large funds and members of large fund families. We argue that these differences in marginal compensation reflect differences in advisor marginal product, differences in the difficulty of monitoring performance, differences in control environments, and scale economies.