Sovereign Debt Repurchases: No Cure for Overhang
论证陷入困境的债务国通过折价回购外部银行债务并不能获益，即使回购能通过缓解债务积压刺激投资，因为债权人会攫取超过100%的效率收益。
Troubled debtor countries do not gain by repurchasing external bank debt at market discount, even if a buyback would stimulate investment by relieving debt overhang. The reason is that buybacks allow creditors to reap more than 100 percent of any efficiency gains that might result from increased investment. We show that open-market buybacks provide a benchmark for evaluating more complex negotiated buyback deals. By comparing any given deal with a hypothetical market buyback of the same size, one can derive upper and lower bounds on the gain to the country. We apply our model to the 1990 Mexican debt deal.