Aggregate and Idiosyncratic Risk in a Frictional Labor Market
在Mortensen-Pissarides匹配模型中引入风险厌恶且消费平滑能力有限的工人，导致均衡工资刚性，并推导出简单解析解，对劳动市场与宏观经济学研究者有参考价值。
This paper develops a tractable extension of a Mortensen-Pissarides style matching model that allows for risk averse workers with limited ability to smooth consumption. I show that this leads to a form of equilibrium wage rigidity, as the inability of workers to smooth their consumption across unemployment and employment spells changes how unemployed workers value wage offers, and hence also the offers that employers find profitable to make. In the model risk-averse entrepreneurs use optimal long-term contracts to attract risk averse workers facing limited access to asset markets. A simple analytic representation for the equilibrium is derived.