Bureaucratic Minimal Squawk Behavior: Theory and Evidence from Regulatory Agencies
构建模型说明，为避免批评的官僚会做出低效决策，即“最小抱怨”行为，并用美国州公用事业委员会数据检验，发现较长任期与更多电价审查和更低电费相关，支持该假说而非“俘获”假说。
This paper develops a model in which a desire to avoid criticism prompts otherwise public-spirited bureaucrats to behave inefficiently. Decisions are taken to keep interest groups quiet and to keep mistakes out of the public eye. The policy implications of this “minimal squawk” behavior are at odds with the view that agencies should be structured to minimize the threat of “capture.” An empirical test using data from US State Public Utility Commissions rejects the capture hypothesis and is consistent with the squawk hypothesis: longer PUC terms of office are associated with a higher incidence of rate reviews and lower household electricity bills.