Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions: Uniform Versus Discriminatory
在无限重复博弈框架下，比较统一价格拍卖和歧视性拍卖中合谋的难易程度，发现统一价格拍卖更易促成合谋，因为投标人可利用与支付无关的报价来缓解执行问题。
Within an infinitely repeated game, I compare the level and conduct of collusion under uniform and discriminatory auctions. For this purpose, I characterize the optimal collusive schemes and sets of sustainable profits under these auction formats. I show that uniform auctions facilitate collusion more than discriminatory auctions: the optimal penal code is equally severe under the two formats; but bidders' deviation incentives are weaker in uniform auctions given that the pay‐off irrelevant bids can be used to relax the enforcement problem. This discussion is particularly relevant after the recent reforms in the electricity industry in England & Wales, and elsewhere.