Going Alone Together: Joint Outside Options in Bilateral Negotiations
提出“联合外部选项”概念，分析双方需共同同意才能退出谈判的情形，如劳资谈判、离婚继承和仲裁，并探讨其对标准讨价还价博弈的影响。
Several contractual situations are such that the parties may ‘step out ’ of negotiations and take up outside opportunities only if there is mutual consent to do so. Examples include employer – employee negotiations, divorce and inheritance procedures, and arbitration. To analyse such cases we develop the general concept of a ‘joint outside option ’ and study its effect in the standard bargaining game. Examples from the international trade and theory of the firm are considered in some depth. In many types of negotiation the parties can ‘agree to disagree’. That is, there are opportunities to exit the current negotiations and switch, by common accord, to a different type of relationship. Consider the following example. Two businessmen are equal partners in an enterprise and are discussing what use to make of their profits. One option is to buy new premises in a prime location. Before doing so, however, they have to agree on the terms of the deal (e.g. who gets the office with the best view). At any moment, during negotiations, some other prospective buyer could snatch the opportunity and the desired new building would ‘disappear’ (which they consider the worst possible outcome). Alternatively, rather than