“偿付能力规则”与“泰勒规则”:货币政策和金融危机关系的另一种解读

'Solvency rule' versus 'Taylor rule': an alternative interpretation of the relation between monetary policy and the economic crisis

Cambridge Journal of Economics · 2012
被引 23
人大 A-ABS 3

中文导读

指出泰勒规则的理论基础薄弱,并提出一个形式上类似但逻辑上替代的“偿付能力规则”,认为货币政策的主要结果是调节企业和工人的偿付能力。

Abstract

One of the more debated interpretations of the economic crisis that started in 2007–08 is based on the ‘Taylor rule’ equation, namely the idea that over the period 2002–05 the Fed has implemented a low-interest policy that has led to the housing bubble and finally to the ‘Great Recession’. This paper shows that the Taylor rule equation not only rests on the so-called ‘new consensus macroeconomics’, but also on the neoclassical theory of growth. The various criticisms raised against these theoretical foundations suggest that interpretations of the Great Recession based on the Taylor rule equation are building their arguments on shaky theoretical premises. Furthermore, this paper shows that an equation formally similar but logically alternative to the Taylor rule can be regarded as the expression of a general condition of solvency of firms and workers. According to this ‘solvency rule’ the prevailing outcome of monetary policy decisions is the ‘regulation’ of insolvencies.

泰勒规则偿付能力规则货币政策经济危机