Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets
研究了机构贷款人如何通过同伴监督（即要求邻居在借款人破产时受罚）来降低违约风险，并以孟加拉国格莱珉银行为例，指出这种机制虽能提升还款率，但将风险从银行转移给了担保人，最终可能改善借款人福利。
A major problem for institutional lenders is ensuring that borrowers exercise prudence in the use of the funds so that the likelihood of repayments is enhanced. One partial solution is peer monitoring: having neighbors who are in a good position to monitor the borrower be required to pay a penalty if the borrower goes bankrupt. Peer monitoring is largely responsible for the successful financial performance of the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh and of similar group lending programs elsewhere. But peer monitoring has a cost. It transfers risk from the bank, which is in a better position to bear risk, to the cosigner. In a simple model of peer monitoring in a competitive credit market, this article demonstrates that the transfer of risk to an improvement in borrowers' welfare.