Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization
研究中央集权与分权的选择，发现中央集权下区域代表投票导致项目选择效率低下，外部性强度与项目数量呈非单调关系，且分权效率收益不一定随外部性减弱或区域异质性增加而提高。
This paper studies the choice between centralization and decentralization of fiscal policy in a political economy setting. With centralization, regional delegates vote over agendas comprising sets of region-specific projects. The outcome is inefficient because the choice of projects is insufficiently sensitive to within-region benefits. The number of projects funded may be non-monotonic in the strength of project externalities. The efficiency gains from decentralization, and the performance of “constitutional rules” (such as majority voting) which may be used to choose between decentralization and centralization, are then discussed in this framework. Weaker externalities and more heterogeneity between regions need not increase the efficiency gain from decentralization. Copyright 2002, Wiley-Blackwell.