Bureaucracy, economic regulation, and the incentive limits of the firm
从交易成本视角研究受管制母公司如何影响其未受管制子公司的治理，发现母公司官僚特征会恶化子公司绩效，对研究企业多元化与管制经济学的学者有参考价值。
Abstract This paper uses a transactions cost perspective to examine the development of organizational tendencies that plague the governance of unregulated subsidiaries by regulated parent companies. By focussing on what Williamson (1985) calls the ‘incentive limits’ of firms, conditions that should exacerbate the problems facing these firms as they diversify are identified. Empirical testing of hypotheses drawn from this discussion is conducted using a sample of nonutility, nonregulated subsidiaries of 54 electric utilities. The analysis, using both linear regression and event history methods, confirms the connection between the characteristics of the regulated parent company and subsidiary performance. The paper concludes with a discussion of how further research might extend the state of knowledge on the topic of the economic losses of bureaucracy.