Firm Accrual Quality Following Restatements: A Signaling View
研究公司财务重述后是否通过提高应计质量和减少真实盈余管理来传递报告可信度改善的信号，发现重述后应计质量显著提升，且CEO变更和改善激励越强提升越大，而转向低质量审计师则削弱提升。
Abstract We consider whether and how firms improve their financial reporting credibility following a restatement by comparing two alternative views. The compliance view predicts that firms simply correct errors to comply with regulations; the signaling view predicts that improvements are broader to allow firms to signal higher reporting quality and thereby reduce information uncertainty. We find that accrual quality improves significantly following the restatement and that this improvement is observed for both earnings and non‐earnings error restatements. We also find that the extent of real earnings’ management decreases significantly. Further, we find that improvements in accrual quality are higher for firms with CEO turnover and higher incentives to improve, but lower for firms switching to an auditor of lower quality. Collectively, our findings suggest that firms signal improved reporting credibility following a restatement through higher accruals quality and lower real earnings management.