Sequential Procurement With Subcontracting
两个对称卖家依次面对分散买家，每个买家通过第二价格拍卖选择低价卖家。研究无分包时合同分配低效，有分包时卖家事前可能更差。
Two symmetric sellers are approached sequentially by fragmented buyers. Each buyer conducts a second‐price auction and purchases from the seller who offers the lower price. Winning an auction affects bidding for future contracts because the sellers have nonconstant marginal costs. We assume that the sellers are completely informed, and we study the unique equilibrium that survives iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. If subcontracting between the sellers is impossible, the final allocation of contracts is generally inefficient. If postauction subcontracting is possible, the sellers can be worse off, ex ante , than when subcontracting is impossible.