Physician Payment Contracts in the Presence of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection: The Theory and Its Application in Ontario
构建了一个包含道德风险和逆向选择的委托代理模型，解释安大略省医生支付改革中医生选择合同的行为及其对服务量的影响。
We develop a stylized principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection to provide a unified framework for understanding some of the most salient features of the recent physician payment reform in Ontario and its impact on physician behavior. These features include the following: (i) physicians can choose a payment contract from a menu that includes an enhanced fee-for-service contract and a blended capitation contract; (ii) the capitation rate is higher, and the cost-reimbursement rate is lower in the blended capitation contract; (iii) physicians sort selectively into the contracts based on their preferences; and (iv) physicians in the blended capitation model provide fewer services than physicians in the enhanced fee-for-service model. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.