Repeated Interaction and the Evolution of Preferences for Reciprocity
用一个间接演化模型研究理性贝叶斯主体中互惠偏好的演化，发现互惠者全程合作，机会主义者合作到最后一期前。
This paper models self‐enforcing agreements and the evolution of preferences for reciprocity when all agents are rational, Bayesian optimisers. In this 'indirect' evolutionary model, player types are defined not by their strategies, but by their preferences. The paper studies the evolution of a community consisting of 'opportunists', who maximise material payoffs, and 'reciprocators', who prefer joint co‐operation to exploiting their opponents. Players are randomly matched to play a finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game. In the unique evolutionary equilibrium, the reciprocators co‐operate throughout their careers, and the opportunists co‐operate up to, but not including, the last stage of their careers.