Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society
研究一个大型社会中随机配对进行共同利益博弈时，廉价谈话如何影响合作。通过非合作解概念，证明存在唯一的循环稳定集，且该集合只包含帕累托最优结果。
This paper considers a large population randomly matched to play a game of common interest with cheap-talk. We apply a noncooperative solution concept to this society. A strategy distribution g is accessible from another distribution f if there is a path from f to g the direction of which is always a best response to the present distribution. A cyclically stable set is a set of strategy distributions which is closed under accessibility and of which any two members are mutually accessible. It is shown that a unique cyclically stable set exists and contains only Pareto optimal outcomes.