Conflicts of Interest in the Stock Recommendations of Investment Banks and Their Determinants
研究投资银行自营交易部门是否在发布买入推荐前后买卖同一股票以获利，发现此类利益冲突确实存在且银行能短期获利。
Abstract This study explores the phenomena associated with conflicts of interest, particularly as they pertain to the brokerage and proprietary trading divisions of investment banks. This distinguishes it from past studies, which have researched conflicts of interest between underwriting and brokerage divisions. We examine whether or not an investment bank issues buy recommendations to the market and buys (sells) the same recommended stocks through its proprietary trading division before (after) recommendations, and if so, to what extent this goes on. We find that these conflicts of interest do exist and that these investment banks can profit from their recommendations in the short run.