NONSTATIONARY RELATIONAL CONTRACTS WITH ADVERSE SELECTION*
构建了一个非平稳关系契约模型，研究企业内部工资动态。工人能力是私人信息且固定不变，雇佣关系中存在学习效应，但道德风险干扰推断，且无法签订长期契约，因此必须使用自我执行的关系契约。最优契约中的工资动态由激励提供与契约执行之间的张力决定，并与学习效应密切相关。
I develop a model of nonstationary relational contracts in order to study internal wage dynamics. Workers are heterogeneous, and each worker’s ability is both private information and fixed for all time. Learning therefore occurs within employment relationships. The inferences, however, are confounded by moral hazard. Incentive provision is restricted by an inability to commit to long‐term contracts. Relational contracts, which must be self‐enforcing, must therefore be used. The wage dynamics in the optimal contract, which are pinned down by the tension between incentive provision and contractual enforcement, are intimately related to the learning effect.